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BOOK REVIEW
RELEVANCE, RELIABILITY, AND VALIDITY OF
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS, by
Kenneth R. Foster & Peter W. Huber. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 333
pp. 1997.
Reviewed by Robert Timothy Reagan*
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court declared federal judges to be
"gatekeepers" charged with meaningful scrutiny of proffered scientific evidence.'
Although the decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 increases
the intellectual burden on lawyers and judges, if we can meet the burden, more just
results will follow.
Kenneth Foster and Peter Huber have offered an intriguing guide to meeting the
intellectual burden of assessing the admissibility of scientific evidence.' The
structure of their 333-page book is excellent. Each of the nine chapters, except for
the first and last, examines an important lesson of Daubert, and begins with text
from Justice Blackmun's majority opinion. In addition, the book is peppered with
sidebar boxes containing reprinted text from other authorities in science and law.
The Daubert text and the sidebars are useful, because they are the raw data
analyzed by Foster and Huber's book. Their inclusion permits ready comparison of
the analysis to the textual data. Unfortunately, certain misconceptions about the
subject matter make the book more provocative for scholars than useful for
practitioners or judges
* A.B. 1980, Stanford University (Human Biology, Psychology); Ph.D. 1986, Harvard University
(Psychology); J.D. 1993, Hastings College of the Law, University of California. Please direct
correspondence to Dr. Tim Reagan, Research Division, The Federal Judicial Center, Thurgood Marshall
Federal Judiciary Building, One Columbus Circle N.E., Washington, DC 20002-8003, (202) 502-4097,
treagan@fjc.gov.
The views expressed in this review are those of the author, and not necessarily those of The Federal
Judicial Center.
1. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 n.7, 597 (1993); see also Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, No. 97-1709, slip op. at 19 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1999); Stephen Breyer, The
Interdependence of Science and Law, 82 JUDICATURE 24, 26 (1998).
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3. KENNETm R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE
FEDERAL COURTS (1997).
4. On a scale from one to four stars, the editors of Jurimetrics gave Foster and Huber's book four
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Scientific Knowledge
Chapter 1 sets the stage for the Daubert analysis. It poses the overarching
question: "[w]hat is scientific knowledge, and when is it reliable?"' The title,
"Scientific Knowledge," is taken from the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
Rule 702. I1 scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.'
Indeed, the Dauberl Court declared Rule 702 to be the "specific Rule that speaks
to the contested issue.
7
Foster and Huber identify three federal rules "that bear directly upon scientific
evidence in court.. . "' In addition to Rule 702, they identify Rule 403, which is
used to exclude misleading evidence, and Rule 703, which permits expert witnesses
to base their conclusions on hearsay. Curiously excluded are Rules 401 and 402,"
the fundamental rules of relevance."
Rule 401. "Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without -the evidence.
Rule 402. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress,
by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible. "
All rules of evidenci are derived from three basic rules. The first is the rule of
relevance. To be admissible, evidence must be relevant to a material issue. The
stars. See Staff, Book Review, 37 JURiMEmRics J. 507, 507-08 (1997). 1 would give it two-and.a.half
or three.
5. FoSrER & HUBER, supra note 3, at 1.
6. FED. R. EviD. 702 (emphasis added).
7. Daubert, 579 U.S. at 588.
8. FOSrER & HUBER, supra note 3, at 11.
9. See Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J.
1535, 1545-46 (1998) (including Rules 401 and 402).
10. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, No. 97-1709, slip op. at 19 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1999)
("[S]cientific expert testimony ... is admissible only if it is both relevant and reliable."); Paul C.
Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1999, 2013-14
(1994).
11. FED. R. EvrD. 401.




second rule is the rule of prejudice. Relevant evidence should be excluded if it is
likely to be misleading. The third rule is the rule of privilege. Relevant evidence
is excluded if exclusion serves a policy goal more important than an accurate factual
determination in a specific case.
The admissibility of scientific evidence is fundamentally a question of
relevance' In Daubert, Justice Blackmun quoted from both Rules 401 and 402
to establish the "baseline" of the Court's analysis. 4
Rule 401 defines relevance in terms of conditional probabilities. Evidence is
relevant if the probability of a fact is different with the evidence from what it would
be without the evidence. That means that the posterior probability (P) of a fact (F),
given the evidence (E), is not equal to the prior probability of the fact. Thus, if:
P(1E) *P(F)
then the evidence is relevant.
In Daubert, the proffered fact was a matter of general causation - that the drug
Bendectin causes birth defects. 5 The legal question was whether plaintiffs'
scientific evidence made the posterior probability (P(F1E)) high enough to justify
a jury verdict in plaintiffs' favor. The District Court and Court of Appeals
determined that it did not.' 6
Of course, the lower courts relied on the older "general acceptance" standard set
forth in Frye v. United States.7 In Frye, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia determined that a "systolic blood pressure deception test [had] not yet
gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony
deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made."'"
Because the court had no personal experience with the accuracy of the test, and
because its accuracy had not yet been established by the scientific community, the
court had no way of determining whether the test was accurate. Therefore, the court
could not determine whether the probability of truthfulness was related to the result
of the test.9 Stated another way, the court could not determine whether the
posterior probability (P(FIE)) was different from the prior probability (P(F)), and
therefore whether the test result was relevant.
13. See Giannelli, supra note 10, at 2009-10; Shelley Storer, Note, The Weight Versus Admissibility
Dilemma: Daubert's Applicability to a Method or Procedure in a Particular Case, 1998 U. ILL L. REV.
231,247.
14. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
15. See id. at 582 ("[R]espondent moved for summary judgment, contending that Bendectin does
not cause birth defects in humans.").
16. See id. at 583-84.
17. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
18. Id.
19. See Lee Loevinger, Science as Evidence, 35 JURIMMICS J. 153, 157 (1995) ("Quite sensibly,
the court concluded that it must determine the reliability and validity of the technology employed; and
it decided that it should look to general acceptance by 'physiological and psychological authorities' as
an indication of, or proxy for, reliability and validity.").
1999]
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Because the admissibility of scientific evidence is fundamentally a question of
relevance, it is a mistake to list only Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as
applicable. The basic question of scientific evidence is a Rule 401 question."
Fit
Rule 702 permits an expert witness to present scientific evidence if the evidence
"will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue ... ,,2" As Justice Blackmun observed, "[t]his condition goes primarily to
relevance."' Foster and Huber devote chapter 2 of their book to the component
of relevance that Justice Blackmun called "fit," a term first used in this context by
Judge Edward R. Becker of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.'
It was "fit" that got the Daubert plaintiffs thrown out of court on remand.'
When the case first came before the Ninth Circuit, the question was one of general
causation - does B-ndectin cause birth defects generally?u On remand, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs might be able to produce enough evidence to
survive summary judgment on the question of general causation, but the plaintiffs
could not produce e:rough evidence to survive summary judgment on the question
of specific causation, that is, whether Bendectin caused the plaintiffs' individual
birth defects.' The plaintiffs' case was entirely circumstantial.' The only proof
they had that Bendectin caused their own birth defects was proof that their mothers
took Bendectin during pregnancy and scientific evidence that Bendectin increases
the risk of birth defects. In order to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
Bendectin caused their birth defects, the plaintiffs had to show that Bendectin at
least doubled the ri;k of defects." Otherwise, most occurrences of birth defects
among babies whose mothers took Bendectin during pregnancy would be
attributable to the underlying risk rather than to Bendectin. The plaintiffs had no
scientific evidence that Bendectin had that great an effect on the risk of birth
defects?
20. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234-35 (3d Cir. 1985).
21. FED. R. EvID. 702; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
22. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
23. See U (citing Downing, 753 F.2d at 1242); see also Clifton T. Hutchinson & Danny S. Ashby,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Redefining the Bases for Admissibility of Expert Scientific
Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1875, 1912 (1994).
24. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms,, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1320-22 (9th Cir. 1995) (Daubert iF).
25. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms,, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 1991) (questioning
"[w]hether Bendectin is responsible for limb reduction defects") (Daubert i).
26. See Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1320.
27. See id. at 1322; see also Michael D. Green, Science is to Lv as the Burden of Proof is to
Significance Testing, 37 JURIMETRICS. J. 205, 205 n.1 (1997) (distinguishing general causation and
specific causation).
28. See Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1320.
29. See id. at 1320-21; see also Green, supra note 27, at 221 (explaining why doubling of risk is
required); Margaret A. Berger, Evidentiary Framework, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 37, 95-96 (1994) (same).




The Ninth Circuit's analysis, however, is subject to possible misinterpretation,
because there was nothing wrong with the fit between the proffered evidence and
the material fact. The court explicitly agreed that proof of general causation can be
circumstantial evidence of specific causation.3' The evidence was simply insuf-
ficient to meet the burden of proof.2
Justice Blackmun's discussion of fit offered as an example astronomical evidence
of whether the moon was full on a particular night.3 Even if the evidence were
quite accurate as to the fullness of the moon, the evidence would be admissible only
to prove such facts as whether the night was dark, but not to prove such facts as
whether people under the moon were especially prone to lunacy.'
The question of fit is whether evidence proves what it purports to prove. Is
evidence that the moon was full probative of whether the night was dark? Yes. Is
it probative of whether people were crazy? No. Is evidence that Bendectin causes
birth defects generally probative of whether it caused birth defects in a specific
case? Yes. Was the evidence strong enough to survive summary judgment in
Daubert? No.
In science, the question of whether evidence proves what it purports to prove is
a question of "validity."3 For example, does an IQ test really measure intel-
ligence?' Do studies of thermal inertia on the surface of Mars tell us how rocky
the surface is?37 Scientists use the term "reliability" to discuss whether scientific
evidence is consistent." Do different IQ tests result in similar scores? Are scores
similar regardless of who administers the test or when? Is Martian thermal inertia
similar when measured from different spacecraft?
In science, reliability is weak circumstantial evidence of validity. A test cannot
be a very good measure of an underlying phenomenon if the results are wildly
inconsistent. Poor reliability, therefore, tends to negate validity. On the other hand,
reliable results - meaning consistent results - are a good indication that the test
is measuring something. Whether or not that something is the something of interest,
however, is another question.
In law, evidence is considered "reliable" if it proves what it purports to prove.39
That is why Justice Blackmun observed: "[iln a case involving scientific evidence,
evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity."' This, really, is what
31. See id. at 1320 ("Modem tort law permits such proof .. 2).
32. See id at 1320-22.
33. See Daubert 1, 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
34. See id
35. See id. at 590 n.9; Harold M. Ginzburg, Use and Misuse of Epidemiologic Data in the
Courtroom: Defining the Limits of Inferential and Particularistic Evidence in Mass Tort Litigation, 12
AM. J.L. & MED. 423, 426 n.13 (1986).
36. See generally Ulrich Neisseret al., intelligence: Knowns and Unknowns, 51AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
77 (1996).
37. See generally Bruce H. Betts & Bruce C. Murray, Thermally Distinct Ejecta Blankets From
Martian Craters, 98 J. GEOPHYSICAL REs. - PLANETS 11,043 (1993).
38. See Ginzburg, supra note 35, at 426 n.14.
39. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: To Junk or Not to Junk,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 33 (1998).
40. Id. at 33-34 (quoting Daubert 1, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9); see also Joseph Sanders, Scientific
1999]
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fit is all about. As Foster and Huber correctly observe: "[i]n law and science alike,
fit is a matter of relevance - the extent to which an observation can be related, by
a credible theory, to the issue at hand."'" Fit is viewed correctly not as a prong of
the Daubert standard, but as another name for it.42
The Court did "not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test. But some
general observations are appropriate."' The four considerations the Court identified
as important are: (1) falsiflability ("whether [the theory or technique] can be (and
has been) tested");" (2) peer review ("whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer rview and publication");"S (3) precision ("the known or potential
rate of error"); ard (4) general acceptance (which "can yet have a bearing on the
inquiry")' This list of considerations fairly describes what scientists would
consider in judging the probative value of scientific evidence."
Folsifiability
In a citation, the Daubert Court quoted philosopher of science Karl Popper,
stating that "the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or
refutability, or testability."'  Foster and Huber, however, title their third chapter
"Testability and Falsification." A theory is falsifiable if it is subject to fal-
sification, but it does not actually have to be falsified. If the theory is falsified, it
is false. If it is not falsified, but could be by conceivable evidence, then the theory
has merit.
Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts After Daubert 78 MINN. L. Ruv. 1387, 1391 (1994).
41. FOSTER & HtU3R, supra note 3, at 23; see also David L Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal
Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying
About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDoZO L. REv. 1799, 1801 (1994) ("Testimony that is not
valid is not relevant."); David L. Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46 HASTINGS
LJ. 555, 568 (1995) (".Jiuries should only hear relevant evidence and scientifically invalid findings are
irrelevant."); Hutchinscn & Ashby, supra note 23, at 1912 ("This consideration relates primarily to
relevance.").
42. Cf. Thomas D. Lyon & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Relevance Ratio: Evaluating the Probative
Value of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 43, 45 n.14 (1996)
("Although Daubert discusses relevance it does so in terms of 'fit' which is analogous to materiality and
concerns the extent to which the expert testimony is 'tied to the facts of the case.'") (quoting Daubert 1,
509 U.S. at 591).
43. Daubert I, 50 , U.S. at 593; see also Kumhp Tire Co. v. Carmichael, No. 97-1709, slip op. at
(U.S. Mar. 23, 1999) ("Dauberts list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all
experts or in every case.").
44. Daubert 1, 509 U.S. at 593.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 594.
47. Id.
48. See Hutchinson & Ashby, supra note 23, at 1886-87. See id. at 1909-12 for a discussion of
other relevant factors.
49. Daubert 1, 509 U.S. at 593; see also. FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 3, at 36 (quoting Daubert
1, 509 U.S. at 593); id, at 40 (quoting Karl Popper).




Foster and Huber's confusion between falsifiability and falsification is likely to
confuse readers who do not come to their text with an understanding of the issue.
The confusion manifests itself in various ways. Foster and Huber observe: "[a]
theory, even though it may be scientific in its basic thrust, is not a very good theory
at all if it is so loosely phrased that it cannot be proved wrong - if it is in fact
wrong."'" This statement is true enough up to the dash, but the last clause is
meaningless. Only a falsifiable theory can be right (true) or wrong (false). A theory
too loosely phrased to be tested can be neither right nor wrong in a scientific sense.
It "isn't even good enough to be wrong."'
Foster and Huber assert that "[m]ost scientists, most of the time, still labor to
confirm, not to falsify, previously articulated theories."' This statement reveals
confusion because it suggests that the falsifiability principle means that scientists
should be engaged in the destructive endeavor of proving each other wrong.' It
is true that scientists often prove hypotheses by disproving rival hypotheses, but the
rival hypotheses are often straw men or "null hypotheses.""5
Foster and Huber conclude their third chapter with the beginning of a recurring
attack on the individual experts who appeared in the Daubert case.' The attack is
largely unfair. Dr. Shanna Swan is criticized for testifying that epidemiological
studies have not proven that Bendectin does not cause birth defects. Foster and
Huber admit that the testimony is correct, but fault Dr. Swan for making the
statement because it might mislead a layperson." The admissibility of evidence is
not a matter to be determined by witnesses, and expert witnesses should not be
vilified because the party for whom they testify has lost the case.
Precision
Foster and Huber's chapter on precision ("Errors in Science") provides a
comprehensive discussion of statistical significance testing. They provide very
51. Id. at 39.
52. Breyer, supra note 1. at 26.
53. FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 3. at 48.
54. For example, physicist and Nobel-laureate Steven Weinberg has observed that "one can imagine
a category of experiments that refute well-accepted theories, theories that have become part of the
standard consensus of physics. Under this category I can find no examples whatever in the past one
hundred years." STEVEN WEINBERG, DREAMS OF A FINAL THEORY: THE SCIENTIST'S SEARCH FOR THE
ULTIMATE LAWS OF NATURE 129-30 (1993). Professor Weinberg noted that falsifying data usually
results in theory modification first and only results in a shift to another theory after the modifications
become too cumbersome as a matter of taste.
[A] scientific theory can never be absolutely ruled out by experimental data because there
is always some way of manipulating the theory or the auxiliary assumptions to create an
agreement between theory and experiment. At some point one simply has to decide
whether the elaborations that are needed to avoid conflict with experiment are just too
ugly to believe.
Id. at 125.
55. FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 3, at 49.
56. See id. at 63-68.
57. See id at 67.
1999]
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useful information on significance levels, confidence intervals, type I and type H
error, and meta-analysis. The chapter includes a very instructive sidebar that shows
how even measurements whose precision we now take for granted were once known
with considerably less precision!' The speed of light is used as an example. This
example also shows how experts can underestimate their own lack of precision or
rate of error.59
This chapter concludes with a gratuitous attack on the Daubert plaintiffs' expert,
Dr. Alan Done.' Dr. Done's testimony was criticized because: "Shanna Swan was
unable to confirm or even explain numerous aspects of Done's analysis."6 Dr.
Done's testimony may or may not have been flawed. Another expert's inability to
confirm or explain it is not dispositive of the issue.
Reliability and Validity
One of the most significant intellectual contributions of Justice Blackmun's
Daubert opinion was his instruction that: "[i]n a case involving scientific evidence,
evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity."' If evidentiary
reliability and scientific validity are equivalent, then Foster and Huber's decision to
devote separate chapters to the two concepts - Chapter 5 on "Reliability" and
Chapter 6 on "Scientific Validity" - seems a poor choice.
The terms "reliability" and "validity" are terms of art in science. That means that
looking to The Oxford English Dictionary for general dictionary definitions, as
Foster and Huber do, is unlikely to achieve a correct result, and does not in this
case.' Behavioral scientists, Dr. Robert Rosenthal and Dr. Ralph Rosnow, define
"reliability" as: "[t]he degree to which observations are consistent or stable."'
They define "validity" as: "[tihe degree to which we observe what we purport to
observe."' The d-gree to which scientific evidence proves what it purports to
prove is a matter of scientific validity, but in court it is a matter of evidentiary
reliability."
Foster and Huber include an interesting discussion of Bayes' theorem. According
to Bayes' theorem, the following is true:'
P(FE) _ P(F) . P(F)
58. See id. at 94-95.
59. See id at 90.
60. See id at 104-07.
61. Id. at 104.
62. Dauber , 50 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993).
63. See FosTER & HUBER, supra note 3, at 111, 138.
64. ROBERTROSETHAL &RALPH L. RoSNow, ESsENTIALS OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 479 (1984)
(glossary).
65. Id. at 482.
66. See Daubert 1, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9.




As in the relevance formula at the beginning of this review, "" stands for the
probability of, "F' stands for the fact at issue, and "E" stands for the evidence. The
tilde "-" means "not," so "-F' means "not F," or that "F," the fact, is not true.
Bayes' theorem shows that the posterior probability of a fact (the probability of
the fact taking into account the evidence) will be different from the prior probability
of a fact (the probability of the fact without knowing the evidence) when the
evidence is more or less likely depending upon whether the fact is true or false. In
symbols, P(F1E) is different from P(F) when P(EIF) is different from P(E-F).'
This means that evidence is relevant if the likelihood ratio for the evidence
conditioned on the fact is different from one.'
Foster and Huber's discussion of Bayes' theorem is important because it refutes
the fallacy of the transposed conditional - the false assumption that P(FIE) equals
P(EIF). Foster and Huber correctly show that a diagnostic test with a 98%
accuracy rate can nevertheless result in a positive result that is right only 15% of
the time if the prior probability of the characteristic tested is low enough."' But
Foster and Huber commit a common error in describing this phenomenon as a low
"predictive value of the test."' This is merely low predictive value of a positive
result. The vast majority of negative results will be accurate.
Foster and Huber also err when they refer to prior probabilities as "initial
guesses."' Prior probabilities are simply the base rate probabilities without taking
into account the evidence on which the posterior probabilities are based.74 It is a
mistake to overinterpret the time metaphor used in the terms. It is simply not true
that "[a]s more evidence comes in, each scientist changes his or her personal
probabilities for each hypothesis and assigns new values, which are called posterior
probabilities."'75 Epidemiologists, for example, do not compute the probability that
Bendectin causes birth defects. They compute the probability that evidence such as
that observed would result if Bendectin did not cause birth defects 6
68. To see how this is so, keep in mind that P(-FIE) = I - P(17'E) and P(-F) = I - P(F).
69. See BERNARD ROBERTSON &G.A. VIGNAUX, INTERPRETING EVIDENCE: EVALUATING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 21 (1995); Stephen E. Fienberg & Mark J. Schervish, The Relevance of
Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Statistical Evidence and for Legal Decisionmaking, 66 B.U.
L. REV. 771, 773-76 (1986); Lyon & Koehler, supra note 42, at 46-47. Professors Lyon and Koehler
describe this likelihood ratio as a "relevance ratio." Id.
70. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Assessing Evidence, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1810, 1837 & n.64
(1996) (discussing the fallacy); Robert Timothy Reagan, Supreme Court Decisions and Probability
Theory: Getting the Analysis Right, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. (forthcoming 1999) (same).
71. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 3, at 116.
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 122.
74. See, e.g., FREDERICK MOSTELLER & DAVID L. WALLACE, APPLIED BAYESIAN AND CLASSICAL
INFERENCE: THE CASE OF THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 49 (2d ed. 1984).
75. FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 3, at 122.
76. See, e.g., Franco Taroni & Colin Aitken, Forensic Science at Trial, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 327,329
(1997). Actually, epidemiologists do not really compute causation probabilities at all. They compute
correlation probabilities. Their method is observational, not experimental. See, e.g., HANS ZEISEL &
KAVID KAYE, PROVE IT WITH FIGURES: EMPIRICAL METODS IN LAW AND LITIGATION 45 (1997).
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Peer Review
Foster and Huber's very interesting chapter on "Peer Review and the Scientific
Community" pierces many of the myths of peer review. The courts' frequent
requirement that an expert's testimony be previously published in a peer-reviewed
academic journal i3 quite a puzzle. Most legal scholarship relied upon by the courts
is not published in peer-reviewed journals, but in student-edited journals.?
The peer review in the selection of an article for publication does not imply that
the scientific community stands behind the article's findings,7a In an ideal case, it
implies only that three to five scientists judged the method to be competent and the
analysis to bb interesting.
Prejudice
Although the admissibility of scientific evidence is fundamentally a question of
relevance, the question of prejudice will often be a factor to consider. Foster and
Huber wisely include a chapter on "Prejudicing, Confusing, or Misleading the Jury."
As they remind us, "[t]his problem [prejudice] is entirely distinct from the ones
discussed elsewhere" in their book.'
Foster and Huber's discussion of sophistry and scientism illuminates many of the
issues that must be considered in determining whether scientific evidence, although
sufficiently valid to be relevant, is, nevertheless, so likely to be overinterpreted as
to be unfairly prejudicial. We do not yet have an easy test to make this deter-
mination, but Foster and Huber offer useful considerations.
Conclusion
Foster and Huber conclude their book with a thirty-three-page summary chapter
which is, in part, merely a shorter version of the book itself. However, it also
includes five new sidebar quotations. As a matter of organization, this chapter is too
short and includes too much new material.
Peter Huber discusses "Bendectin in the Press: The Misreporting of Law and
Science" in an aiticle attached to the book as Appendix A. This addendum is
largely a complaint that the press treated Merrell Dow badly during the course of
the Bendectin litigation. Some observations, such as that Linda Greenhouse of the
New York Times is one of the best legal reporters working," are true enough. But
the prediction made by the San Diego Union-Tribune that the Supreme Court's
decision in Daubert meant that the case would go to trial is not a good example of
77. See, e.g., Lawn Noah, Sanctifying Scientific Peer Review: Publication as a Proxyfor Regulatory
Decisionmaking, 59 U. Prrr. L. REv. 677, 694 (1998).
78. See, e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, The Meaning of Daubert and What That Means For Forensic
Science, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 2103, 2111 (1994).
79. See generally Hutchinson & Ashby, supra note 23, at 1900-05; Noah, supra note 77, at 678.
80. FOSTER & H13BER, supra note 3, at 209.




poor journalism.' Indeed, a jury trial was a possibility after the Supreme Court's
decision. The Ninth Circuit's Court of Appeals, however, threw out the case on a
ground not considered previously in the litigation.'
Foster and Huber's analysis of Daubert and its implications is provocative and
interesting. Although it will inspire useful thinking by sophisticated readers, it is
likely to mislead the unsophisticated on many issues. Therefore, it should not be
relied upon heavily in the course of litigation.
82. See id. at 264.
83. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc,, 43 F.3d 1311, 1320-22 (9th Cir. 1995)
(affirming Merell Dow's summary judgement on the ground that plaintiffs could not prove that
Bendectin at least doubted the risk of birth defects).
1999]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol52/iss2/7
